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THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY
TO ENFORCE CHARITABLE USES.
The jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery to enforce charitable
uses, is very obscure, owing-to the fact that, since the statutes of
Elizabeth, to be hereafter noticed, it has not been necessary, in
England, to examine the subject historically. As those statutes
were not re-enacted in this country, the original jurisdiction of
that court becomes here, not merely a subject of speculation, but
of strictly legal inquiry. The investigation must be made with
most imperfect data. The student is carried back to a period
when chancery reports did not exist, and in regard to which little
authentic information was accessible until the publication of the
results of the "record commission." Our great jurists who have
made the subject a study, have not agreed in their conclusions.
Among the dead who have taken a prominent part in the discussions growing out of this topic, may be mentioned the names of
Kent, Story, and Marshall; among the living, that venerable sage
of the Philadelphia bar, who did so much to secure to his own
city the princely benefaction of Girard. Questions involving this
subject have, in late years, arisen nowhere so frequently as in the
State of New York. Owing to a difference of opinion among the
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members of the bench, they have been discussed with great ardor
and thoroughness of research.' It is now time to gather up the
results of these discussions as well as by an independent examination of the various sources of information, to present the matter
in a systematic form. As the question of the jurisdiction of the
court is mainly historical, a foundation of our inquiry should be
laid in an examination of the principles of the Roman law upon
the subject of charities.
The principles of the civil law concerning charities.-Charity
was one of the earliest and finest flowers of Christianity. While
the administration of charitable funds occupied the attention of
Roman rulers during most of the perioa of the Empire, no trace
can be found of such property in those twelve tables so greatly
extolled by Cicero, nor in any of the sources of law during the
period of the republic.
The church, from the outset, devoted its revenue to the use of
the poor, because it was regarded as their patrimony. The bishop
was the legal depositary of these revenues. Under him were
superintendents, who had the actual disbursement of the income of
the church. The deacons were declared to be his "hand, mouth,
and soul." Hospitals were established to simplify their labors,
called xenones or xenodochia. The nurses, here employed,
formed one of *the minor orders of the clergy, and the office of
the modern Sisters of Charity was anticipated as early as the days
of St. Jerome. This class of establishments, whether founded by
the bishops or not, was placed under their care, as their administration was regarded as a matter essentially ecclesiastical.
Contributions for the use of the poor were treated as religious
acts. The writings of the time mention many legacies in which
the testator provided by the same gift both for the support of the
indigent, and for the forgiveness of his sins.2 The revenues pro1 Among the recent arguments of counsel, pre-eminent for historical research and
affluence of learning, may be noticed that of W. Curtis Noyes, Esq., of the New
York bar, in the case of Beekman vs. The People-Ct. Appeals.
2 This form of gift was greatly employed in the Middle Ages.
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vided for charitable purposes were tithes, legacies, donations of
movables and inmovables, given to churches and otherwise. These
gifts became so numerous, and were, at times, so improper, that
conscientious bishops returned them to the next of kin, stating,
that though they were valid by the human law, they were void by
the divine law. The resources of believers were apparently
poured out without stint, both because it was a privilege and a
duty to support "Christ's poor." I
At the time of Constantine, charity became organized and systematized. Individual almsgiving was mainly -displaced by the
dispensation of 'charity through regular channels. The churches
acquired legal rights to hold property. The Church of Rome possessed houses and lands not only in Italy and Sicily, but in Syria,
Asia Minor, and Egypt. Charity flowed, in general, through such
channels as the church provided. The State, as such, in a few
instances previous to the time of Justinian, had bestowed charity
for special and peculiar reasons; but, in his reign, it abdicated
such functions through sheer exhaustion, and definitely left the
charge of the poor to private and to voluntary benefactions.
The monasteries, from an early period, admitted into their
bosom a crowd of poor, who could have found elsewhere no means
of subsistence. They were also places of refuge, and supplied the
means of education to children.
The objects of charity were very diversified. Besides the support of the poor and th6 sustentation of hospitals, the redemption
of captives was in a large measure made by the aid of the church.
Severity of taxation was also alleviated. It was said by one that
"Christ chose to be born at the time of a census for the purpose
of teaching collectors their duty of equity and mercy."
Legislation followed in aid of the efforts of the church. This
was of a two-fold character: First,in providing peculiar rules in
favor of legacies to pious uses; and, Second, in the establishment
of rules for the administration of the charity.
1 This continued to be true down to the time of Justinian.

"Some with the

highest hope in God, and to save their souls, run to the churches, bringing and
bestowing all their property for the use of the poor and needy."-Cod. 1, 3, 42.
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I. In the time of Yalentinian and Marcian, A. C. 452, it was
provided that legacies in favor of the poor should be maintained,
even though the legatees were not designated.' It would appear
to be implied from this passage that a legacy left to "undesignated persons" was, in general, void. What the words "uncertain
person" (incertus persona) mean, is not entirely clear. It would
seem, from another part of the code, that they included guilds or
associations, as well as individuals. Cod. VI. 48.2
Leo and Anthemius enacted that, notwithstanding the uncertainty of persons, every legacy or fidei commissum, made for the
redemption of captives, should be, in the course of the year, consecrated to that use by the bishop of the place. The text, so far
as this branch of the subject is concerned, is as follows: No heir
or legatee shall in any manner unjustly disappoint the intention of
the testator by asserting that a legacy left for the redemption of
captives is uncertain. If the testator named any one by whom he
desired that such legacy should be carried into effect, let such person have the liberty of exacting the legacy or trust, and let him
scrupulously fulfil the wish of the testator. But if no person is
designated, and the testator has only fixed the amount to be used
for this purpose, let the bishop of the place where the testator was
born, have the power to demand the gift. But when the testator
who has left such a legacy lives beyond the limits of the Empire,
(barbaroe sit nationis,) and doubt arises in respect to his native
country, let the bishop of the State in which the testator died,
have the power to receive the legacy." ' It appears from this passage that the bishop was only made superintendent in cases where
the testator had provided no method for carrying the will into
effect, and had only fixed the amount to be appropriated to a
charitable purpose.
Where the language of the will was indefinite, and not capable
1Id quod pauperibus testamento vel codicillis relinquitur non ut incertis personis
relictum evanescat, sed omnibus modis ratum firmumque consistat.-ode, 1, 3, 24.
2 The edition of the Corpus Juris, from which citations are made, is Beck's
Leipsic, 1831.
3 Code, 1, 3, 28.
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of precise application, provision was made by Justinian for an
arbitrary method of- determining the testator's intention. The
Roman law did not favor methods of interpretation so strict as
those which have prevailed in modern times. The rule that oral
evidence is not admissible to vary the meaning of a written instrument, seems to have been expressly repudiated by Justinian. He
says: "where the deceased had in his mind a different word from
that which he used, we decided, in the case of a certain Ponticus,
that the written language should not prevail over the truth."
With such notions we should not be surprised that he established
the following constitutions: 11Since we have in many wills found
provisions in which our Lord Jesus Christ is named as heir,
without the mention of any chapel or church, and since we have
seen that much uncertainty thence arises according to our ancient
laws, we determine, by way of emendation, that in such a case the
holy church of the city or district where the deceased resided,
must have been intended to have been instituted heir. The same
view is to be adopted in the case of a legacy or of property given
in trust (fidei commissum), and the church is to hold it in trust for
the poor. If the gift was made to an archangel, or to one of the
blessed martyrs, a provision which I have known to be made by
one of high rank and learned in theology and law, it should be
bestowed .upon a church constructed in honor of that archangel
and martyr; but if there be none such, then upon the Church of
the metropolis," &c.
2. The law would compel a donor to carry pious intentions into
effect when the intentions had assumed a legal form. Thus, if a
donor had devoted property to a saint, prophet, or angel, to construct a church, and had proclaimed the gift to a .magistrate, he
and his heirs must carry the provision into effect. The same rule
was applied to gifts in behalf of hospitals. The bishops and governors of hospitals were charged with the duty of observing that
the intention was effectuated.' In fact, by the direction of JusI The admini,ration of the funds was to 'be in accordance with the donor's
intentions; administratio secundum ea qum his qui liberalitatem exercuerunt visa
fucrunt et secundum proescriptos fines fiat.
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tinian, every gift (donatio) to charitable purposes exceeding five
hundred solidi, must have been made in judicial form. It was
otherwise void.'
3. Heirs or legatees could be compelled to erect buildings for
charitable purposes. In case of a church they were allowed three
years, in case of a hospital, a single year, to complete the necessary structures, and, in the meantime, a building might be hired,
in which beds for the sick could be made until the hospital was
constructed. If the heirs did not perform the duty within the
specified time, the bishop and President of the province could
2
insist on its fulfilment.
4. If a gift to charitable uses could not be carried into effect in
the manner in which the testator provided, his main design must
be observed, and the property must, in some other form, be devoted
to a charitable use. This was not so wide a departure from the
intention of the donor as it might seem, because the principal reason, "the forgiveness of sins," would still exist. The cy pros
doctrine, thus originated, is not theoretically objectionable so long
as the primal idea of charitable gifts prevailed; the religious duty
of the donor and his consequent reward.
Like principles prevailed if the testator made the poor his heirs.
The hospital of the State or city obtained the property, and its
managers divided the income among the sick, either through the
receipt of rents, if lands were given, or, if movable property had
been bestowed, by the purchase of immovable, so that an annual
and permanent support might be secured to them. "For who
need help more than those who find themselves in poverty and in
a hospital, and who, on account of corporeal weakness, cannot
obtain the means of life." The hospital stands in the position of
an heir: can bring actions for debts, and must respond to creditors.
If there are several hospitals, then the gift went to the one which
needed it most, to be determined by the bishop. These provisions
1 Cod. 1, 2, 19.
2 The objects to which gifts "ad pias causas" might be made were churches,

hospitals, houses for the sick, poor, aged, and for foundlings, the poor themselves,
and the State. Id.
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were only applicable in cases of uncertainty in the disposition of
the property. If the donee was ascertained, whether an individual, or an organization for charitable purposes, the funds belonged
to the person or organization designated. Sin autem in personam
certain venerabilem certumve domum respexerit, ei tantummdo
hereditatem vel legatum competere sancimus. This decree was
accompanied with the sternest threats in case the administrators
of the property derived, or allowed others to derive, any personal
advantage from this sacred trust.
5. A gift to pious uses was privileged above other legacies.
Thus, as a general rule, a testator could not so dispose of his property as to withdraw it entirely from his heirs. The part of his
estate which they could claim was termed the "falcidian portion."
But a testator could, by adopting a particular form, bestow all his
property for pious purposes, even though his object was to evade
the law, (ad declinandum legem falcidiam.) Justinian is careful
enough to provide, in a special title, how this evasion may be made
by the testator.' This idea of the privileged character of a legacy
to pious uses, which had its germ in the civil law, produced most
fruitful results when, transplanted into the canon and ecclesiastical law, as will be seen hereafter in citations from Swinburne and
other authorities.
6. The State favored this class of gifts by providing that they
should be exempt from taxation for profits, and also by establishing a different term of prescription in claiming them, from that
which prevailed in other cases. Code 1, 2, 23.
II.-TMe method of administeringeharities.-1. The general control of a charity, if not placed by the testator under the care of
particular persons, was given to the bishop or governors of hospitals, but they were not independent of the State. Thus, in the
directions of Leo and Anthemius respecting the application of
funds set apart for the redemption of captives, it was required
that the bishop should make known to the governor of the province, by a written statement, the time when the funds were
1 Code, 1, 3, 49.
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received and the amount paid. After the lapse of a year he was
required to state, in the same manner, the number of captives redeemed, and the amount paid for them, so that it might be certain
that the pious intentions of the testator were carried into effect.
In all these engagements the bishop was expected to act gratuitously, in order that the funds might not, under the pretence of
beneficence, be wasted in the expenses of courts. Justinian provided that no gift to the bishop or a governor of a hospital should
belong to him personally, but should be devoted to the charitable
purpose. He urges the celibacy of the clergy, on the ground
that charitable funds will otherwise be wasted in providing for
their families.'
2. While the testator could select those who should dispense his
bounty, the bishop superintended their management, being required
"to have a watchful eye over them, to praise them when they fulfilled their duty, to chide and remove those who are negligent, and,
in such case, to appoint other trustees, who had the true fear of
God in their hearts, and the final day of judgment in their eye."
3. But it was not enough that the law had thus placed the bishop
over the governor of the charity, and had made that ecclesiastic, in
turn, amenable to the archbishop or to the Governor of the Province. Every citizen, without distinction, was empowered to make
a judicial complaint that the charitable intention of the testator
was not fulfiled, because it was a matter that concerned the public
weal; and the bishop was solemnly cautioned, that by such criminal delay on his part, he not only incurred the risk of punishment
of Heayen, but also that he would suffer from the wrath of the
Emperor. This remarkable passage from the Code, shows that
the great principle of the public nature of a charity, was judicially
recognised to the same extent -as at present, although no officer
like the attorney-general was employed to represent the public, in
a proceeding to establish the public right.'
4. Provisions of a complicated nature were established, to prevent the sale or alienation of charitable estates. Justinian must,
from his frequent ordinances on this subject, have paid great atten1 Code,

1, 3, 42.

2. Code, 1, 3, 46.
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tion to the details of the management of this kind of property. The
trustees, who for the time being had the control, were not allowed
to compound the yearly rents for a gross sum, and thus put themselves in a position to expend the whole estate. "Were it otherwise, the yearly rents and the eternal remembrance of the dead, on
account of which he left the property, shall not remain, but it and
the estates will vanish together." All such, and other alienations,
were declared to be void, and the governor of the charity had, notwithstanding the alienation, power to demand the property again
by a legal proceeding. No period of prescription barred the right.
The purchaser had no claim upon the fund for indemnity.'
In another constitution Justinian reiterates his statements in
respect to the permanent nature of a charity, and rises to higher
reasons for it than the narrow and selfish one of simply preserving
the memory of the deceased donor. "While," he says, "a certain
term of life is given to each man by his Creator, which ends with
death, in respect to those pious institutions which are under the
continuing protection of God, this is not the case; and so long as
they exist (for they continue forever, so long as the name of Christ
exists and is worshipped among men), it is just that their revenues
should continue forever, in order that they may serve for the pious
objects which will themselves never cease. ' 2 He proceeds to enact,
in still stronger terms, that no injury shall happen to these institutions by the alienation of their property, but that they may demand
it, without diminution, from the purchaser. Finally, in the 7th
Novel of Justinian, the Emperor established a digested and systematic series of rules respecting the right of churches, hospitals,
and the various asylums for orphans and the aged, s to alienate their
property. It was conceived in the Greek language, that it might
be of universal application to his empire. All right of alienation
was taken away from each of these institutions, except that the
Emperor might take the property, if necessary, for the public good.
2 Code, 1, 3, 57.
3 These institutiofis were always classed together as bing consecrated to God.
Consecratme Deo oedes. (Ecolesioe videlicet Xenodochia, et atropha et orphanotropha.) Const. 13, Leo.

1 Code, 1, 3, 46.

138

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY

The right of "eminent domain" can be exercised, upon the principle so happily established in modern times, by paying a just compensation. This remarkable passage is as follows: "Permittimus
igitur Imperatori ut si quaedam in commune utilis et ad reipublicMe
utilitatem spectans necessitas adsit, quoque possessionem ejusmodi
rei immobilis qualem proposuimus, exigat, earn a sanctissimis
ecclesiis reliquisque sacris domibus et collegiis illi accipere liceat
ut tamen semper, sacroe domus indemnes serventur et ab accipiente res cequalis vel major quam data eat, vicissim detur." The
reason given for the exercise of the right is also far-seeing. There
is but a slight difference, in the eye of reason, between such property as is devoted to charity, and that which is given to ordinary public uses. (Neque enim multum inter se differunt sacerdotium et imperium neque res sacre a rebus communibus et publicis.)
He but anticipates the classification of charities in the statute of
43 Elizabeth, where provisions for the building and support of
bridges are coupled with the supply of funds for the support of
hospitals.
This constitution also protected these institutions against improper acquisitions. If sterile land was sold to them as fertile, or even
given to them, it could be returned, and the price demanded. -But
if land had been sold by the charitable institution, it could be
demanded again without returning the price to the purchaser.
This was a penalty imposed upon him for presuming to enter into
a contract which was forbidden by public policy.
Particular churches received the right to sell their property on
making application to the Emperor, as was the case of the "Church
of the Resurrection" at Jerusalem (40th Novel). "The prohibition
against alienation was established for the good of the church.
Why should not alienation be permitted when a greater good can
be derived from the sale ?"'

The general law was subsequently modified by a provision permitting the property to be alienated to pay public or individual
I Corpus juris Civilis, Vol. 4, p. 259, Ed. Beck.
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debts upon a judicial examination of the case, and with the observance of great precautions that no fraud should be practised.1
The general scope of this legislation is nowhere more clearly
shown than in the special provisions established for the province
of Mysia. It appeared from the representations of a certain bishop,
that many houses had been left to the church for the redemption
of captives and the support of the poor, but that these objects could
not be accomplished, from the nature of the property. The Emperor responds, that wherever the lands yield a certain rent they
must not be sold, for the charitable object can be accomplished by
means of the rent. But if the property yields no rent, or is dilapidated, or far distant from the church, it may be sold, and the proceeds applied to these two purposes only, in favor of liberty and
life; for the possession of property cannot be so necessary as is
the freedom of the captive and the sustentation of the poor. If the
land was sold merely on account of its distance, the testator must
have given in his will his consent to a sale, and his very words
2
must be incorporated into the instrument of alienation.
These various provisions are systematized in the one hundred
and twentieth constitution, which allows charitable property in
other places besides the metropolis to be leased by a perpetual
lease rendering rent. If it became necessary to sell land to pay
debts, it was to be publicly advertised, so as to create a-competition among purchasers. The buyer was to pay the price down.
If no purchasers could be found, the property was to be transforred
to the creditor at a valuation. The land was to be taken instead
of payment, the tenth part of the estimated value being added to
the original valuation, as its price.'
The results of this examination may be briefly. recapitulated.
The Roman law greatly encouraged the gift of property for charitable purposes, under which term were included foundations for
I C.
2

J. C., Vol. 4, p. 280.

C. 3. C., Nov. 65, 4 Vol. 336.

3 The meaning of this sentence may not have been correctly apprehended. The
text is, "justa et diligente mstimatione facta, atque decima parte totius restima.
fionis pretio ad eandem quantitatem addita."
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churches, hospitals, and asylums for the poor and aged. It could
be given either by gift inter vivos, causa mortis, or by will. Immovables could be devoted to such purposes, as well as movables,
and a donor might direct that money should be appropriated to
the purchase of land. No legacy of this kind was allowed to fail
because it was uncertain, if the design of the testator was to bestow
it for charitable purposes. Such gifts were privileged above others.
A donor who had, in an authentic manner, declared his intention
to make such a disposition of his property could be compelled to
carry it into effect.
The donor could himself select those who were to manage his
bounty and prescribe the purposes to which it should be applied.
His directions must, if possible, be strictly complied with. If his
intention could not be exactly carried out, his main design must
be accomplished. If he made no selection, the gift was managed
by the bishops or by the heads of hospitals and asylums. They
were obliged, in some cases at least, to render an account of their
trust. Improper "trustees, (as we may term them for want of a
better name,) were removed and new ones appointed. Charities
were public in their nature, and any citizen could complain if they
were not duly administered. Charitable property could not be placed
in the same category with individual property. The right to the
latter terminated at death; but the design of a charitable gift was
that it might be perpetual, both in order that the name of the
founder might not be forgotten, and because charitable objects
were in their own nature enduring. In general the property could
not be sold, although it might be leased. The transfer was contrary to the policy of the law, and the purchaser must devote the
property to the trust. The right of "eminent domain" was, however, superior to that of the charitable use, on condition of the
payment of a just compensation for the property. It might be
sold for the payment of debts, but not because it was unproductive, unless it so happened that the testator had expressed an intention to that effect in his will, and then only in special cases.
We can but wonder at the admirable system which was thus
devised in the main by a single emperor, Justinian. The general
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principles of this branch of the law, as administered at the present day, were then clearly recognised.
THE ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE STATUTE OF ELIZABETH.

It cannot be doubted that, after the fall of the Roman Empire,
and during the middle ages, charitable gifts continued to be made.
The limits of this article do not admit any full citation of early
cases. The great motive which prevailed during the empire still
continued to be expressed, the "forgiveness of sins" and consequent
reward. No more striking instance of this, perhaps, exists than a
gift made by Baldwin, Count of Flanders, in the year of the Norman Conquest, 1066: "1Moreover, my wife desiring to be a partaker with me in almsgiving and reward from our Lord, and remembering that word of the Lord, I I was a stranger, and ye took
me in; I was hungry, and ye gave me food,' I have given-a villa
to a church for the support and refreshment of the poor."'
Without stopping to show that charitable gifts of a similar kind
were made in England, as could be easily done, we may proceed
to inquire in what methods gifts of property might be made.
They might either be of land or personal property. If land were
transferred, it might either be by a direct conveyance, through
the medium of uses, or in certain localities by a will. As our
object is to investigate the jurisdiction of Chancery to enforce the
gift in this class of cases, the inquiry will be confined to the question whether a transfer of land for charitable purposes could be
made at common law through the medium of feoffments to uses
and through wills.
1. _Peoffments to uses.
It is not necessary to our discussion to trace the origin of uses
1 Heirs do not appear to have readily acquiesced in wills of this kind, at least
if we may judge from the objurgations contained in the instruments of donation.
One is as follows: "If any of our heirs shall oppose this donation, let him be
anathematized, and his name be blotted out of the celestial book of the living; let
him be a consort of Judas Iscariot, and, if he will not alter his purpose, may God
change his senses and involve him in the doom of Ananias and Sapphira," p. 24.
These maledictions would lead to the conclusion that legal remedies were quite
imperfect. Codex Donationum Piarum. Brussels, 1624.
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and the jurisdiction of Chancery over them. It is well known that
they had their origin in the Roman law, and were introduced into
England through the medium of the clerical chancellors. It came
to be settled that an owner of land could, by simply making a
feoffment of his land to another for his own use, enable himself to
make a disposition of his property in a different manner from what
he could otherwise have done. This arrangement would have been
void at common law, as being contradictory to the feoffment.'
But this very fact was a good reason why it should have been enforced in Chancery, as being against conscience, not to fulfil the
direction of the feoffor. Thus the chancellor says, in the Year
Book 7 H. VII. f. 12: "Where there is no remedy at common law,
there may be good remedy in conscience, as, for example, by a
feoffment upon confidence, the feoffor has no remedy by common
law, and yet by conscience he has; and so, if the feoffee transfers
to another who knows of this confidence, the feoffor, by means of
a subpoena, will have his rights in this Court." The justices agreed
with him in opinion that, where there was no remedy at common
law, there would be remedy in chancery. The reporter adds, quod
nota. The original owner was field to have a use in the land
which he could enforce in that court. He could direct his feoffors
to hold the property for the use of another, whereupon such person
could also have the use enforced in his favor. This principle could
be used to enable the owner of the land to make a will, for he
could make a feoffment of the land to the use of his will. The
will operated simply as a direction to the feoffors to whose use
they were to hold the land after his death. This person stood in
the place of the feoffor, and could enforce the direction in Chancery, and thus the heir might be disinherited.
1 June, J., expresses the reason for this, (Year Book, 7 H. VI. 43 :) "One day,
between Westminster and Charing Cross, I met Master Hank, (whom God assoilzie,)
and he demanded of me whether, if he should enfeoff me in fee, proviso that he
should always have the profits of the land, who should have them. And I replied
the feoffee for the deed shall be taken more to the advantage of the feoffee than of the
feoffor, so the feoffment shall be good and the proviso void, and this was his opin-"
ion." This little glimpse of two ancient lawyers talking law as they met in the
street., is not without interest.
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It is not easy to say at what time this doctrine was first established. The earliest case in which the question is known to have
been discussed, is in Statham's Abridgment, 31 H. VI., title Conscience, A. D. 1453. The case was heard in the Exchequer Chamber before all the judges. It was common, at that time, to adjourn
Chancery questions into this Court, as will be seen hereafter.
I , The clerk of the rolls reported a matter in Chancery that one
had made a feoffment of trust, and had declared his will to the
feoffee after the feoffment that one of his daughters should have the
land. And afterwards he came to the said feoffee, and said that the
one who had the land did not wish to marry, &c., and, therefore, he
revoked his will, and desired that another daughter should have the
land after his decease. Then he died, and the question was which
of the two daughters had the land." It will be observed that the
very statement of the case involves the idea that the trust could
be enforced, so as to disinherit the heir, because, otherwise, the
land would have descended to the two daughters equally in coparcenary. After the various judges had discussed the question, Fortescue, C. J., remarked,. "We are not to argue law in this case,
but conscience, and it seems to me that he could change his will for
special cause; put the case: I have issue a daughter, and I am
sick, and I enfeoff a man and say to him that my daughter should
have the land after my decease, and then I revive and have issue
a son; now it is right that my son should have the land because
he is my heir, and if I had had a son at the time, I would not have
made such a will; and the law is the same if I will that one of my
sons should have the land, and he becomes a robber, &c. And conscience comes from con and scio, to know at the same time with
God; that is, to know his will as near as possible by. reason, wherefore a man can have land by our law and by conscience he will be
condemned." One of the judges then expressed himself to the
effect that the uses of the feoffment could not be declared after
the making thereof, but only contemporaneously with it; but this
was denied by the others, and Statham remarks that the residue
of the matter must be sought in Chancery.
1 1 Camp. Ld. Chancellors, 319-20.

Coke, .

144

THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF CHANCERY

This case shows that the distinction between law and equity was
well understood. The term "conscience " is used as in other instances, to indicate the jurisdiction of a court of equity. Fortescue was familiar with general principles of jurisprudence. 1 From
the instances he puts, he could have had no doubt that the declaration of uses could be supported against the heir. The edition
of Statham's book, in which this case is found, was printed in
1470, only seventeen years after the decision.
Lord Bacon's view of the law, before the statute of uses, was
evidently the same. "Men used this device to make a will. They
conveyed their full estates of their lands, in their good health, to
friends in trust, properly called feoffees in trust, and then they
would by their wills declare how their friends should dispose of
their lands, and if those friends would not perform it, the Court
of Chancery was to compel them, by reason of trust, and this trust
was called the use of the land, so as the feoffees had the land and
the party himself had the use; which use was in equity to take the
profits for himself, and that the feoffees should make such an estate
as he should appoint them; and if he appointed none, then the
use should go to the heir, as the estate itself of the land should
have done, for the use was to the estate like a shadow following
the body." 2

In all cases of Jeoffments to uses, this extract shows, with most
transparent clearness, that the use could be enforced in chancery
against the feoffees, and that the only question with the court was,
whether the testator had properly appointed the use; if not, the
use descended to the heir, for that was all the interest that his
ancestor had after the feoffment. The heir could then compel the
feoffees to convey to him.
It is true that Lord Bacon, in his "Reading on the statute of uses,"
raises some doubt whether the decree could be made against the
heir of the feoffee as well as against the feoffee himself. This
point, however, does not militate against the remedy but only
against its extent. In other words, this at least was true, that so
1 1 Camp. Ld. Chan. 318.
2

Lord Bacon's Tract on "the Use of the Law," p. 57, London, 1639.

TO ENFORCE CHARITABLE USES.

145

long as the feoffee lived, any use declared by the last will of the
feoffor could be enforced againsthim. But it is at least doubtful
whether Lord Bacon's statement upon this last point is historically
correct. The case to which he refers is probably the Year Book
8 E. IV. 6. A suit in chancery was brought against three executors, and only one appeared. The question was whether the suit
could proceed in the absence of the others. The court, after deciding that it could not, converse in respect to the question whether a
"subpcena" would lie against the executor or heir. And Choke, J.,
said that he had brought "subpoenas" against the heir of the feoffee,
and the matter was for a long time debated. The opinion of the
chancellor and the justices was, that it did not lie against the heir,
wherefore the plaintiff must sue a bill in Parliament. Fairfax said
that this was a good subject to dispute about, after the others (meaning the executors) had come in, &c.1 Choke's statement, that he
had known of such suits, is certainly greatly to be preferred to
the mere dicta of the judges without argument. Fairfax's remark
shows that the question was not to be treated as settled. The
Lord Chancellor had occupied his seat only for a few months.
Lord Bacon's version of this case would lead to the idea that
Choke thought there were no instances of suing the heir, while
Choke, himself, says directly the contrary, and that it was the
advice of the judges that the subpona did not lie, when it was
evidently a mere dictum, and the decision was postponed.
It may be urged that the breach of trust involved, in not fulfilling the declaration of uses upon a will, was properly Aemedial
only in the spiritual court. This proposition was urged to the
chancellor in the 8th E. IV., Year Book, fol. 4, and was overruled.
It was claimed that a case of a breach of faith, must be sued in
the court Christian; but the court said that when any one was
damaged by the non-performance of a promise involving confi1 The original French is: Et fuit move si subpoena gist vs. execut. ou envs. un
heire. Et Chok dit que ilsua subpoena autfoits vs. le heire do un feoffee et le
matter fuit longtemps debate. Et l'opinion de Chane et les justices que ilne gist
pas envs le heire, per que ilsua un bill al Parliament. Fairfax-Cest matter est
bon store pur disputer apres quand les autres veign. &c.
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dence, he shall have a remedy in chancery. It was then said that
it was the "folly" of the plaintiff to have trusted the defendant.
The chancellor replied, so you might say if 1 enfeoff a man in
trust, c., if lie does not do my will, I shall have no remedy in
common law, for it was my folly to enfeoff a person who would
not do my will, but he shall have remedy in this court,for God is
the proctor of the foolish, &c. 1
It will be remembered that no infringement of the principles
of chancery took place by sustaining this doctrine. The feoffee
could not claim want of consideration, for he had received the
land upon the faith that he would fulfil the directions of the testator. The same principles which would lead the Court of Chancery to enforce a contract involving a pecuniary consideration,2
would induce it to compel a feoffee to fulfil directions made in a
will.
Later authorities are clearly in the same direction. Thus, in
Year Book 15 H. VII. fol. 11, it was said, if one has feoffees upon
confidence, and makes his will that they shall sell his land to pay
his debts, the creditors can compel them to sell. And so, if the
will be that a stranger should sell this land to J. S., now J. S.
can compel this stranger, by subpoena, to sell this land to him.
In Year Book 15 H. VII. fol. 12, it is expressly stated that the
ordinary or bishop had nothing to do with wills made upon feoffments to uses. Fineux, C. J., said, "if one has feoffees upon confidence, and make his will that his executors shall sell his land,
now if the executors refuse the administration of the goods, still
they can sell the land, because the will of land is not a ' testamentary thing,' (n'est chose testamentaire,) nor have the executors
anything to do with the will, except that they have a special power
conferred upon them. And if one has feoffees, and makes his will
that his executors shall sell his land, and then makes no executors:
1 Original.-Per Chancellor: Et issint poies dire si jeo enfeoff un home en trust,
&c., s'il ne voit faire ma Tolunt jeo n'avera remedy p'vous car il est ma foly d'en
feoffer tiel person que ne voit faire ma volunt, &c., mes il avera remedy en cest
court Car Deus est procurator fatuorum, &c.
2 This was done in 37 H. VI., 1 Ld. Camp. 319.
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now the ordinary cannot meddle with the land, nor can the administrator, for the ordinary can only meddle with the testamentary
matters-that is, with goods, and consequently the same rule
applies to his administrator, who is his deputy. And it was lately
adjudged in the Exchequer Chamber, by all the judges of England, that if one makes a will of his land, that his executors shall
sell, &c., if the executors refuse the administration and to be
executors, neither the administrators nor ordinary can sell or
alien. And if one makes his will that his executors shall sell his
land, without naming them, still, if they refuse administration and
to be executors, they can sell the land." The other judges concurred in these statements.
This doctrine is evidently in accordance with principle. The
ground of the bishop or ordinary's jurisdiction over personal property was, that in the absence of a will it should be used by him
for pious purposes. As the will was an attempt to withdraw the
property from his own control, he was allowed to examine and test
its validity. But, as in the case of real estate, in the absence of
a will the use would descend to tke heir, no reason could be given
for his adjudicating the question.
The result would seem to be that a use of any kind could be
enforced by the Court of Chancery, and that the only question
remaining for discussion is, when and in what cases could a declaration for charitable purposes, made by the original owner to the
feoffee, be deemed a "use."
If it comes within the definition of
that term, it must, on general principles, be enforced in that court.
The examination of the term "use" will be deferred until the
question regarding the jurisdiction of chancery over wzls of land,
made in accordance with the custom of London and that of other
localities, is discussed.
T. W. D.
(To be Continued.)

